

Phenomenologically speaking, one can consider the body to be normative on two levels. Husserl speaks of the normal body as a norm that defines the general conditions of perception and functions as an optimum that serves the aim of adequate perception. But on a more concrete level, the experiencing body itself is normative; it generates norms through repeated actions and interactions, crystallizing into habits. In this sense, the normative or habitual body enables a normal or harmonious experience in that it allows for an effortless orientation as well as familiarity, and stability within the lifeworld and during social interactions.

According to Foucauldian approaches, the subjective body does not generate norms but is itself produced by norms: Dominant social norms are incorporated and integrated within our experience via repeated practices and techniques of power. In the works of Foucault and related approaches in feminist philosophy, habit formation thus becomes highly problematic: it does not enable us with skills and a stable personal identity, but rather constrains (and disciplines) embodied subjectivity according to dominant norms. Instead of guaranteeing a normal (i.e. concordant, stable) experience in the phenomenological sense, it leads to what Foucault calls a normalization.

How is the individual level of habit formation in phenomenology related to this embodiment of supra-individual norms? In what sense can we differentiate between a habit formation that results in a skill and one that (forcefully) disciplines a body? To address these questions the paper will analyze examples of the *embodiment of norms* in Foucault and feminist philosophy and show how they rely on the phenomenological concept of the actual and habitual body.